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INTRODUCTION
The debate over the broadcasting legal regulatory framework in Zimbabwe falls within 
the general discourse on freedom of expression, information and the media. Accordingly, 
issues relating to the reform of the laws governing broadcasting have to be discussed within 
the general context of the rights to freedom of expression, access to information and freedom 
of the media. Within this context important constitutional and human rights imperatives 
arise which have to be reviewed so as to properly understand the issues which are crucial 
in the process of regulating broadcasting and broadcasting services. Broadcasting does 
not and cannot take place in a vacuum. It is not and cannot be a purposeless exercise 
without social ends. The essence of broadcasting includes or encompasses the obligation 
to inform, the right of citizens to be informed, their right to acquire knowledge and 
information, their right to entertainment and recreation and indeed their right to be 
educated. It is for this reason that broadcasting is an important social and political issue 
which ought to concern all those who believe in democratic government. This paper is 
divided into four parts of which this introduction is the first. The second part discusses 
the importance of free speech and freedom of information to individual self realisation 
and to the institution and maintenance of democratic and accountable government. The 
third part discusses the scope of the right to free speech within the context of international 
human rights instruments. The fourth part discusses the recognition and implementation 
of the right in Zimbabwe and also analyses the broadcasting laws within the context of the 
Constitution. The fifth and final part suggests recommendations to create a more liberal 
legal regulatory framework for broadcasting.
THE IMPOF1TANCE OF FREE SPEECH
The right of free speech or the freedom of expression is universally recognised as one of 
the most precious of all political rights which is central to democratic governance and 
which is a precondition of republican government. One of the most influential founding 
fathers of the American Constitution, James Madison, perceptively observed a long time 
ago that:
A popular government without popular information or the means to acquire it is but 
a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern 
ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves 
with the power which knowledge gives.1
Information and knowledge are essential preconditions for the effective operation of a 
representative and democratic government. Information and knowledge are not only 
necessary for the personal self-fulfillment and realisation of each and every individual but
1 The Complete Madison, 1953, p.335.
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are also necessary to enable each person to participate meaningfully in public affairs. In 
this sense the rights of free speech and access to information are preconditions for the 
effective functioning of a democracy.
Know ledge is interw oven with the concept o f man. Every person must have the 
possibility of know ing the elements o f his environment, the intellectual and scientific 
achievem ents of his fellowmen, the facts and the developm ents that affect or may 
affect his life and generally all those elem ents and facts which will enable him not 
only to survive but also freely to develop his personality. Knowledge cannot and should 
not be the monopoly of the few. It is a wealth which must be accessible to everybody.
Those who lack knowledge are doomed to be always victims o f those who know ; 
victims o f deceit and distortion o f facts; victim s o f irrationality because undoubtedly 
every person who is ill-informed cannot think correctly.2
This same point has received widespread judicial recognition and is most elegantly made 
by Mr Justice Cardozo in Palko v Connecticut 302 US 319 at 327 as follows:
Freedom of thought and speech . . .  is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of 
nearly every other form of freedom.3
The very first comprehensive Declaration of Human Rights, the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789, in its Article 11 declared and categorised the right to 
free speech as the most precious of all the rights of man. In RD DSU Local 580 v Dolphin 
Delivery Ltd (1986) 33 DLR (4th) 174, McIntyre J put the same point somewhat differently 
but with equal elegance:
Representative democracy, as w e know it today, which is in great part the product of 
free expression and discussion of varying ideas, depends upon (th e ) . . .  maintenance 
and protection [of the right o f free speech).
For its part, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court has also underlined the importance of the 
right to freedom of expression. In In re Munhumeso and Others 1994(1) ZLR 49(S) Chief 
Justice Gubbay emphasized the importance and centrality of free speech in the following
words:
The im portance attaching to the exercise o f the right to freedom of expression and 
freedom of assem bly must never be under-estimated. They lie at the foundation o f a 
dem ocratic society and are one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the 
developm ent of every man. Freedom of expression, is one of the most precious of all 
the guaranteed freedoms.
The Chief Justice reiterated the same point in Woods and Others v Minister of Justice and 
Others 1994(2) ZLR  195(S) as follows:
In In re Munhumeso . . .  this court characterised the right to freedom o f expression as
among the most precious o f all the protected freedoms, lying at the very foundation
of a dem ocratic society; and one always to be jealously guarded by the courts.4
0
Freedom of expression is thus not only of itself central to democracy but is also important 
for the enjoyment of other human rights. Conceptually, freedom of expression is founded 
on two theoretical or philosophical bases, namely its importance for the establishment, 
operation and maintenance of democratic political and social processes and institutions
2 Andras Sajo, Rights of Access to the Media, at p. 3.
3 At page 56-57.
4 At page 198.
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and its necessity for the self-fulfilment, actualisation and realisation of each individual in 
the process of his intellectual and personal development as a human being participating in 
all aspects of human endeavour. One of the most important indicators of the freeness of 
any people is the level and depth of the exercise of their right to free speech. The freer and 
more democratic a nation is, the less are the restrictions and constraints on its people to 
express themselves through the various modes of expression. More importantly, a true 
measure of whether or not any nation is a functional democracy is the extent to which its 
media institutions are capable and infact do operate freely allowing all citizens the maximum 
degree of access to information on every aspect of social and political life. A media under 
captivity either of the state or the ruling elites or a few powerful individuals regardless of 
whether it is in public hands or private ones is the very antithesis of the right to free speech 
and freedom of expression and inevitably undermines both individual self-fulfilment and 
the capacity of the people to participate effectively in pubic affairs.
FREE SPEECH IN HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
The right to free speech is recognised and protected in varied formulations in virtually all 
international and regional instruments on human rights. Article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights provides that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
In similar vein the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in its Article 19 
states that:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; the right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless 
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his choice.
Article 10 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers . . . .
Similarly Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights provides that:
(1) Every individual shall have the right to receive information.
(2) Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions 
within the law.5
Clearly that the protection of free speech as a human right is well established in international 
human rights instruments is beyond dis'pute. Indeed, there is a large body of jurisprudence 
on this right in international law.
Freedom of expression as a fundamental right is provided for in Section 20(1) of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe which states that:
Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be 
hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold
5 See also Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights.
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opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference, and 
freedom with his correspondence.
This formulation is essentially modelled on the various international human rights 
instruments cited above. It is clear from the Zimbabwe provision that conceptually the 
right to freedom of information embraces five distinct but related elements or notions, 
namely:
(i) the right to form and hold opinions;
(ii) the right to impart, receive and seek information;
(iii) the right to generate, impart, receive and seek ideas;
(iv) the right to express opinions and ideas;
(v) the right not to have one's correspondence interfered with.
While it is clear that the right to freedom of expression includes freedom of the press and 
other media, it is noteworthy that the current formulation of this right in the Zimbabwean 
Constitution is old fashioned. More modem formulations which expressly encompass 
freedom of the media, freedom of artistic expression, freedom of scientific research and 
academic freedom are to be found, for example, in the Constitutions of South Africa, 
Namibia and Canada. Section 16(1) of the South African Constitution states that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes:
a) freedom of the press and other media;
b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;
c) freedom of artistic creativity; and
d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.
Section 21(1 )(a) of the Constitution of Namibia provides that:
(1) AH persons shall have the right to: (a) freedom of speech and expression, which 
shall include freedom of the press and other media.
Similarly, Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that:
Everyone has the . .  . freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including 
freedom of the press and other media communication.
In Zimbabwe the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs has taken the view, 
as expressed in its Policy Document on Press Freedom, that since there are judicial decisions 
and pronouncements from renowned jurists to the effect that the term "freedom of 
expression" includes the freedom of the media there is no need to reformulate section 
20(1) of the Zimbabwean Constitution to specifically include an express reference to freedom 
of the media. In the policy document it is somewhat naively asserted that:
To create now a special statement of the freedom of the Press would be taken to mean 
that the Constitution is granting to the Press som ething more or something different 
to that w hich is enjoyed already by everybody, including the press. To alter the 
Constitution to provide for this would bp unnecessary and undesirable.
This view is not only conservative but runs contrary to international trends, particularly 
from within the region which has seen a progressive development of formulations which 
expressly state that the right to freedom of expression includes freedom of the media, 
academic freedom and artistic expression. It is noteworthy that both the Ministry and the 
office of the Attorney-General have often taken highly conservative and sometimes anti­
democratic positions on many areas involving not only expansion of human rights but 
also clearer, more modem and inclusive human rights formulations. It is as if these public 
offices are incapable of developing both in terms of their capacity for visionary thinking 
and also in terms of familiarity with modem debates on human rights formulations.
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The effectiveness of the protection of the right to freedom of expression in a democratic 
and free society, largely depends on the capacity and ability of individuals to access 
information and yet it is clear that as presently formulated freedom of expression in the 
Zimbabwean Constitution does not include freedom of access to information. In interpreting 
the similarly worded Article 10 of the European Convention quoted above, the European 
Court has rejected the argument that Article 10 must be understood to encompass a right 
to access to information on which to base an opinion.6 More modern National Constitutions 
expressly provide for the protection of an independent right of access to information to 
complement the protection of freedom of expression. For example, section 32 of the South 
African Constitution states that:
(1) Everyone has the right of access to:
a) any information held by the state; and
b) any information that is held by another person and that is required for the 
exercise or protection of any rights.
It is clear that the right to freedom of expression when cast as a right to information is still 
in the process of development, particularly in the light of technological developments in 
the field of information dissemination. Freedom of expression together with the right of 
access to information make up the right which today is generally known as the right to 
information. This right embraces five distinct and related ideas or elements:
1 The right of each individual to obtain or receive information on any issue of his 
choice, either directly or through the media without state or other interference.
2 The right to access private sources of information and ideas without any 
obstruction by the state.
3 The right to access state sources or state controlled sources of information in 
relation to any matter of personal or public interest.
4 The right to seek, receive and impart information by any means without 
interference and without censorship or alteration of its contents.
5 The right or freedom to constitute, create or establish news agencies or organs or 
institution for the dissemination of information without interference. This includes 
the maintenance of the independence, impartiality and objectivity of such organs, 
agencies and institutions; and the exclusion of monopolies over news and 
information dissemination.
The right to information requires the free and unhindered flow of information and ideas to 
and within the public in general. Included within this right are the various modes of 
expression or information dissemination, that is to say, oral and verbal speech, written 
speech; cinema, theatre, dance, paintings, exhibitions, radio, television, newspapers and 
magazines (the press) and music. The right to information embraces not just the content of 
the speech or what has to be said or published or disseminated but also the means or the 
mode of transmitting or receiving the information concerned.
BROADCASTING LAWS AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN ZIMBABWE
That the electronic broadcast media, namely radio and television, is the most important 
medium of mass communication in Zimbabwe is beyond dispute. Radio broadcasts are
6 See generally, Leander v Sweden 1987(9) EHER 433 where the Court remarked that: " . . .  the right to 
freedom to receive information, basically prohibits a government from restricting a person from 
receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him . . .  [It does not) confer on 
the individual the right of access to a register containing information on his personal position, nor does 
it embody an obligation on the Government to impart such information to the individual" (at p.456).
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particularly important as radio communications reach practically every comer of the country 
whereas television and the press (newspapers and magazines) are largely limited to urban 
areas and often to the middle and upper classes.
Broadcasting in Zimbabwe, or rather the electronic broadcasting media, was from the outset 
exclusively in the hands of state monopolies under the framework of the Broadcasting Act 
which has remained virtually intact from the days of its inception during the colonial period.
The Broadcasting Act, Chapter 12.01 regulates and controls all broadcasting, that is radio 
and television communications in Zimbabwe. The principal provision in the Act is section 
27 which prohibits all persons, other than the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (a state 
owned and controlled entity), from carrying on any broadcasting service. It reads:
No person other than the C orporation shall carry on a broadcasting service in 
Zimbabwe.
Broadcasting service is defined in section 2 as meaning any "radio communication service 
for reception by members of the general public", while radio communication service is 
defined as "the transmission, emission or reception of writing, signs, signals, pictures, 
impulses or sounds of any description whatsoever wholly or partly by means of Hertzian 
waves". Taken together and read within the context of section 27 these definitions mean 
that the Act establishes a state monopoly over radio and television broadcasting and makes 
it unlawful for any person other than the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation to carry 
out any broadcasting service in Zimbabwe.
Thus no broadcasting service, not even under license, may be carried out by any person 
other than the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation ("the ZBC") which is itself created 
and perpetuated by section 3 of the Act. The ZBC is placed under the general control of a 
Board of G overnors appointed by the M inister of Inform ation , Posts and 
Telecommunications "after consultation and in accordance with any directions the President 
may give him".7 Members of the Board of Governors are removable by the Minister, who 
in any event has sweeping powers over the operations and activities of the ZBC. For 
example, the Minister may direct the Corporation to broadcast, without charge any 
announcement or statement of public importance which the Minister may supply in 
writing.8
The functions of the Corporation are spelt out in section 14 of the Broadcasting Act which 
provides that:
The functions of the Corporation shall be:
a) to carry on broadcasting services for the information, education and entertainment 
of listeners in Zim babwe; and
b) if the Minister so requires, to carry on, in accordance with conditions specified by 
the Minister, broadcasting services for such purposes as the M inister may specify 
for reception by listeners outside Zimbabwe; and
c) to provide or, subject to section 28, permit others to provide diffusion services; 
and
d) to carry on or operate such undertakings as, in the opinion o f the Board, are 
incidental or conducive to the exercise of one or m ore of the functions specified in 
paragraphs (a) and (c) as the Board may consider expedient.
7 Section 4.
8 Section 29(1'). Sec also the powers of the Minister in sections 2 8 ,8 6  and 38.
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The Broadcasting Act must be read together with the Radiocommunication Services Act, 
Chapter 12:04 whose purposes are given as "to provide for the control of and supervision 
over radio communication services within, into and from Zimbabwe" and "to provide for 
the provision of radiocommunication services by the Posts and Telecommunications 
Corporation" ("the PTC"). Under this Act the PTC is given power to "regulate, control and 
supervise. . .  radio stations and radio communications services in Zimbabwe".9 The PTC 
may also establish such radiocommunication services, other than broadcasting services, as 
it may consider necessary or desirable in the public interest.10 Clearly, the Radio 
Communication Services Act allows the PTC to control and regulate private radio 
com m unication excluding broadcasting services of any description. Thus public 
broadcasting remains a ZBC monopoly.
The Right to Information and Broadcasting Monopoly
Pluralism is an essential element of the freedom of information. As Mr Justice Holmes 
remarked in Abrams v U.S., L. Ed.11
The ultim ate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas —  the best test of
truth is the power o f the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the m arket.
The purpose of the right to freedom of information is to allow the maximum degree of 
contestation of different, varied and sometimes opposed ideas and views in the market 
place of ideas. Each individual should have the opportunity to hear, to receive and to 
consider all the available ideas and information and to come to his own conclusions and to 
make his own judgements on what is true, valid and persuasive. This can only be achieved 
if and when the diversity of existing ideas is recognised, channelled and allowed full 
expression within a framework recognising and promoting the existence of a variety of 
independent and autonomous media. Independent and autonomous media inevitably 
permits the processing and reflection of diverse and varied ideas and opinions. Free speech 
and free dissemination of both speech and information are the essence of self-government. 
Citizens have a right to receive and to choose information and ideas from varied and 
competing sources or broadcasters.
In this context it is clear that any monopoly in providing broadcasting services is inherently 
undemocratic and hinders the full and harmonious realisation or enjoyment of the freedom 
of free speech and information. In modern society, radio and television are undoubtedly 
the most important and most effective means of communication to the generality of the 
public. In Zimbabwe, radio and television communication as methods of mass media 
communication have the greatest penetration across the length and breadth of the country.
State monopoly and indeed any monopoly of radio and television is incompatible with the 
right to information. Both the European Commission of Human Rights and the European 
Court of Human Rights have held that the refusal by a state party to grant permits to 
private individuals to establish broadcasting stations because of the existence of a state 
monopoly amounts to a violation of the right of freedom of speech and the right to 
information protected and guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention. In 
Informationsverein Lentia and Others v Austria in EC HR, Series A, Vol. 276 the European 
Court remarked:
9 Section 4.
10 Section 5.
11 63-64, at pp. 1173.
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The Court has frequently stressed the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a 
d em ocratic society, in p articu lar w here, through the press, it serves to im part 
inform ation and ideas of general interest, which the public is m oreover entitled to 
receive. Such an undertaking cannot be successfully accomplished unless it is grounded 
on the principle o f pluralism , o f w hich the state is the ultim ate guarantor. This 
observation is especially valid in relation to audio-visual media, whose programmes 
are often broadcast very widely. O f all the means of ensuring that these values are 
respected, a public m onopoly is one which imposes the greatest restrictions on the 
freedom o f expression, namely the total impossibility of broadcasting otherw ise than 
through a national station . . . The far-reaching character of such restrictions means 
that they can only be justified where they correspond to a pressing need.
Thus it cannot be in dispute that the establishment and maintenance of a broadcasting 
monopoly be it public or private amounts to an abridgement of the freedom of expression 
and the right to information. The only question is whether such an abridgement of so 
fundamental a right can be justified against a pressing need. In Zimbabwe, prima facie, it 
appears as if the ZBC monopoly is authorised by the Constitution within the framework of 
the protection of freedom of expression in section 20. While sub-section 1 of section 20 
quoted above, protects the freedom of expression and information, paragraph (b)(iv) of 
sub-section (2) appears to permit derogation from this right through the establishment of a 
broadcasting monopoly by providing that:
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority o f any law shall be held to be
in contravention of sub-section (1) to the extent that the law in question makes
provision —
a) ......................
b) for the purpose of —
i) ..........................
ii) ..........................
iii) ..........................
iv) regulating the technical adm inistration, technical op eration  or general 
efficiency of telephony, telegraphy, posts, wireless broadcasting or television 
or creating or regulating any monopoly in these fields except so far as that 
provision or, as the case may be, the thing done under the authority thereof 
is show n not to be reasonably justifiab le in a d em ocratic society  (m y 
emphasis).
On face value this provision appears to authorize the making of provisions allowing for 
the establishment of a monopoly in broadcasting and hence would appear to save the 
provisions of section 27 of the Broadcasting Act which creates a broadcasting monopoly in 
favour of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation.
In Retrofit (Pvt) v The PTC and Another SC 136/95 and in Retrofit (Pvt) Ltd v The Minister o f 
Information Posts and Telecommunications SC 238/95 the Supreme Court ruled that section 
26(1) of the Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, Chapter 12:02 which granted the 
PTC a monopoly over the provision of cellular telephone service, was unconstitutional as 
it violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. The above quoted 
provision of section 20(2)(b)(iv) of the Constitution which envisages the establishment of a 
monopoly on both the provision of broadcasting and telephony services did not, it was 
held, save section 26(1) of the Posts and Telecommunications Act which created the PTC 
monopoly. The Supreme Court found that that provision went further than was reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society and therefore failed to pass the test implicit in the proviso 
inherent in that provision.
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During the course of its judgement the Supreme Court had occasion not only to make 
reference to judgements from other jurisdictions dealing with state monopolies in the 
provision of broadcasting services but also to discuss the broad purposes served by the 
protection of freedom of expression. In respect of the latter the Supreme Court observed 
that:
. . .  freedom of expression has four broad special purposes to serve. These are:
a) It helps an individual to obtain self fulfillm ent. Speech is an expression of self, 
w hether effected by face to face exchange, or over the telephone, by writing, by 
pictures, or by any other mode. The desire to com m unicate, to express feelings 
thoughts and to contribute to discussion and debate, is an essential attribute of 
human nature. To unreasonably prevent a person from expressing a view, belief 
or emotion is to deny his or her basic dignity, freedom and individual autonom y 
as a human being . . .
b) It assists in the discovery of truth. The search for truth rationale has been articulated 
in terms of the famous 'm arket place of ideas' concept. This holds that truth will 
emerge out of the com petition of ideas . . .
c) It strengthens the capacity of the individual to participate in d ecision-m aking. . .
d) It provides a mechanism by which it would be possible to establish a reasonable 
balance betw een stability and social change . . .. Restraint im pedes rational 
discussion and reduces society's ability to adjust to changing circum stances. The 
experience of participation makes it easier for those whose view s are rejected or 
criticised to accept and abide by decisions reached through an open, objective 
and non-coercive process. T he uninhibited exchange o f ideas, opinions and 
information is, after all, the very lifeblood o f democracy.12
The Court went on to say that the right to freedom of expression "enjoins not only that 
persons be free to express themselves, but also that they are not hindered in the means of 
their expression". Thus the right not "only applies to the content of information but also to 
the means of transmission or reception since any restriction imposed on the means 
necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart inform ation".13
Further on the Court made reference to a variety of cases from other jurisdiction holding 
that a monopoly by its very nature inhibits freedom of speech and concluded that:
These cases, and there are others, underline the principle that restriction upon or 
interference with the means of com m unication, whatever form it may take, abridges 
the guarantee of freedom of expression. A fortiori any monopoly which has the effect, 
w hatever its purpose, o f h ind ering the right to receive and im part ideas and 
inform ation, violates the protection of this paramount right.
Clearly, therefore, the approach of the Supreme Court is that prima facie any monopoly in 
the field of broadcasting and telecommunication hinders the exercise of the freedom of 
expression. By the same token this should mean that the broadcasting monopoly granted 
to the ZBC by section 27 of the Broadcasting Act hinders the free exercise of the freedom of 
speech and information. The only question is whether such a monopoly is reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society so as to be saved by the provisions of section 2(X2)(b)(iv) 
which envisage the establishment, maintenance and regulation of a broadcasting monopoly 
provided that such a monopoly is reasonable and justifiable in a free and democratic society.
In a long line of cases, including Woods and Others v Minister of justice, Legal and Parliamentary 
Affairs and Others 1995 (1) SA 703 (ZSC, the Supreme Court has observed that:
12 At pp. 13-15.
13 At p. 15.
.J
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W hat is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society is an elusive concept. It is one 
that defies precise definition by the Courts. There is no legal yardstick, save that the 
quality of reasonableness of the provision under attack is to be adjudged on whether 
it arbitrarily or excessively invades the enjoyment o f the guaranteed right according 
to the standards of a society that has a proper respect for the rights and freedoms of 
the individual.
However, notwithstanding the difficulties of determining what is reasonably justifiable in 
a democratic society, the Supreme Court has sought to lay down a general three pronged 
test to determine whether or not any provision hindering a fundamental right is reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society. This test was first enunciated in Nyambirai v National 
Social Security Authority and Another SC-110-95 where the Court held that in determining 
whether or not a limitation complained of is permissible or is reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society it will ask the following questions:
(i) Is the legislative objective sought to be achieved sufficiently important to justify 
the limitation of a fundamental right?
(ii) Are the measures designed to meet the legislative objective rationally connected 
to that objective and are they not arbitrary, unfair or based on unreasonable 
considerations?
(iii) Are the means used in impairing the right or freedom more than is necessary to 
accom plish the objective?
This test was also used in the Retrofit judgements referred to above where it was found 
that the stated objectives of the PTC monopoly were not of sufficient importance to warrant 
a serious inroad into the right of freedom of expression; that there was no rational connection 
between the granted monopoly and the stated objective of bringing order and method to 
the provision of a mobile cellular telephone service and also that the monopoly was not 
the least drastic means in achieving the objective of bringing order and method to the 
provision of cellular telephone services.
It is submitted that when measured against the above tests the broadcasting monopoly 
granted to the ZBC would also, like that of the PTC, fail and is thus likely to be declared 
unconstitutional if it were challenged. It seems, however, unlikely that the ZBC broadcasting 
monopoly will be challenged in the courts as the Minister of Information, Posts and 
Telecommunications is on record having said that government has agreed to amend the 
Broadcasting Act so as to remove the ZBC monopoly over the provision of broadcasting 
services. What is of concern though, is the fact that its more than two years since the 
government announced that it had decided to liberalise the airwaves by abolishing the 
ZBC monopoly and yet to date the Act has not been amended to implement this new 
policy. It remains to be seen as to when the government will finally repeal section 27 of the 
Broadcasting Act.
However, even when the ZBC monopoly is broken it will remain necessary and important, 
for the ZBC, to break out of its present situation where it has been largely reduced to a 
propaganda mouthpiece of the ruling party and government of the day. As a public utility 
the ZBC has a duty and obligation to balance its power with the right of those who do not 
share the ideas and views of the ruling party to be heard fairly and effectively. Thus it is 
incumbent upon the ZBC whether operating in a pluralistic broadcasting context or in a 
monopoly as is presently the case, and more so in a monopoly, to allow and to present all 
shades of opinion in a fair and balanced manner reflecting the generality and diversity of 
political, social, economic and cultural opinions of Zimbabweans.
To allow only the ruling party mainstream views to receive recognition and broadcasting, 
particularly during pre-election times, is undoubtedly an infringement of the people's right
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to free speech and freedom of information. It must be appreciated that the essence of any 
freedom is the right of he who disagrees with popular sentiments and ideas not only to 
express himself but also to be heard. In this sense freedom of information is particularly 
important as the right of those with ideas and views which shock, offend or challenge the 
majority or mainstream ideas and views to be heard. There is profound wisdom in the 
words of the United States Supreme Court in Terminiello v Chicago, 93 L Ed. p. 1740 when it 
stated that the:
function of free speech . . .  is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose 
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they 
are, or even stirs people to anger.
It is in this context that there is an obligation on the broadcasting media, particularly one 
enjoying a dejure or de facto monopoly, to provide the public with a balanced coverage of 
issues and events, particularly those that have a bearing on the political landscape of the 
country. It is crucially important for the broadcasting media in Zimbabwe, that is, radio 
and television, to cease operating as instruments of propaganda in the hands of governing 
political parties. In Rhodesia, they served the racist and fascist interests of the Smith 
government and in independent Zimbabwe, they have so far served the interests of ZANU 
(PF). The result has been that all Zimbabweans who do not share the ruling party's world 
view and even those who do, but are critical of the present leadership's style of government, 
have had no access or at best extremely limited access to the broadcasting media. No serious 
and self-respecting analyst would dispute the fact that in the post-independence period 
the national broadcasting media has been heavily used as a ZANU (PF) propaganda 
mouthpiece. Opposition political parties and critical and patriotic Zimbabwean analysts 
have been denied full and unhindered access to the public broadcast media which has 
acted as if it were merely the ruling party's information department. Clearly, ZBC practice 
has effectively hindered or altogether denied the right to information and the freedom of 
expression of many Zimbabweans who are not ZANU (PF) propagandists and admirers.
This has been made possible by two factors. Firstly, that the ZBC enjoys a legally sanctioned 
monopoly over the country's broadcasting airwaves. This monopoly means that the ZBC 
can broadcast any rubbish and deny alternative non ZANU (PF) views and ideas a forum 
and yet have no fear that competition may drive it out of business. Secondly, the overall 
control over the administration and management of ZBC has, in practice, t>een placed in 
the hands of persons chosen entirely on the basis of their loyalty and commitment to serving 
the interests of ZANU (PF). Even at the level of senior staff appointments membership or 
at the very least loyalty to ZANU (PF) appears to be a more important factor than 
professional integrity and competence. The result is a broadcasting media which is no 
more than an extension of the ruling party's information and propaganda machinery, at 
great cost to national integrity in that open, unhindered and honest debate, discussion and 
contestation of ideas on matters of national interest be it in politics, economics and science 
is completely negated.
Accordingly, broadcasting reforms, apart from abolishing the ZBC monopoly, must also 
go further and put in place an independent Board to run the publicly owned broadcasting 
media. All forms of Ministerial control of the ZBC should be removed and instruments 
and institutional mechanisms be put in place to achieve, develop and safeguard the 
independence of the administration of the public broadcasting media. Procedures to ensure 
or allow reasonable access to the broadcasting media by all shades of political opinion 
need to be instituted. The starting point is the establishment of an independent Board to be 
in charge of the public broadcasting media. Clearly such a Board cannot be independent if
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the majority of its members are government appointees. The majority of Board members 
should be appointed or at least nominated by various organisations representing 
independent civil society such as trade unions, employers' organisations and human rights 
organisations. Ministerial appointees should be granted security of tenure once appointed. 
The Board should have full authority over ZBC and all political interference in the 
management and administration of the organisation should be brought to an end. 
Management and professional staff should be left to carry out their duties without political 
directives.
The abolition of the ZBC broadcasting monopoly and the opening of the airwaves to other 
players would obviously require the setting up and establishment of an independent 
broadcasting authority to set standards and issue licenses to all the possible players in the 
broadcasting industry. The authority would have general powers to regulate and monitor 
the broadcasting media in Zimbabwe.
CONCLUSION
It is self-evident that freedom of speech and freedom of information and access to 
information are fundamental rights which are at the core not only of individual self- 
realisation but also democratic, accountable and representative government. These rights 
should be guarded jealously. A people who lose them ultimately lose their very freedom as 
a people.
In Zimbabwe, it is clear that there is a need for a review of the constitutional protection of 
these rights so that freedom of expression is expressly stated not only to include the freedom 
of the media but also freedom of access to information which is very important for the 
exercise of the right of free speech. Further, section 20(2)(b)(iv) of the Constitution which 
seems to allow the establishment of monopolies derogating from free speech should be 
repealed so that the constitution sets a standard which expressly disallows broadcasting 
monopolies of every kind. At the ordinary statutory level, the repeal of section 27 of the 
Broadcasting Act is long overdue.
Also long overdue is the removal of Ministerial and political control over the public 
broadcasting service which must be placed under an independent broadcasting authority, 
which must in turn set up a broadcasting framework which allows unhindered access to 
the broadcast media by all shades of opinion in Zimbabwe. Only in such conditions can it 
be said that Zimbabweans are a free people with the right and ability to exercise and enjoy 
free speech and freedom of information and access thereto.
Although not canvassed in this paper, there is also a need to revisit the widely formulated 
Censorship and Entertainment Control Act, Chapter 10:04 so as to curtail the sweeping 
powers of the Board of Censors or to abolish it altogether.
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